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Abstract 
The paper employs a post-Kaleckian model to analyse how currency devaluations affect 
aggregate demand and capital accumulation in an economy with foreign currency liabilities in 
the short-run. In benchmark post-Kaleckian open economy models currency devaluations have 
two effects. First, they change international price competitiveness and thus affect net exports. 
Second, devaluations change income distribution and thereby affect consumption and investment 
demand. The overall effect on aggregate demand and investment is ambiguous and depends on 
parameter values. Existing models, however, disregard balance sheet effects that arise from 
foreign currency-denominated external debt. The paper develops a novel post-Kaleckian open 
economy model that introduces foreign currency-denominated external debt and balance sheet 
effects to examine the demand-effects of devaluations. Furthermore, the paper models the 
dynamics of external and domestic corporate debt. It discusses how an economy may end up in 
a vicious cycle of foreign-currency indebtedness, and derives the conditions under which 
indebtedness becomes stable or unstable. It shows that the existence of foreign currency-
denominated debt means that contractionary devaluations are more likely, and that foreign 
interest rate hikes, and high illiquidity and risk premia compromise debt sustainability. 
Devaluations only stabilise debt ratios if they succeed in boosting domestic capital accumulation. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong liquidity in the global financial centres in the post-crisis period has made it easier for 
firms of middle-income countries to borrow abroad. As a result, the share of foreign-currency 
denominated liabilities on the balance sheets of corporations in many middle-income countries 
has increased sharply since 2010 (IMF, 2015, chap. 3; Chui et al., 2016). The resulting currency 
mismatch, however, exposes corporations to greater risks of currency, interest rate, and liquidity 
shocks.1 In economies with strongly managed exchange rates, this situation raises the question 
of the effectiveness of currency devaluations as a macroeconomic adjustment tool. While 
currency devaluations may – after some time – succeed in improving the trade balance, it is less 
clear whether they also boost aggregate demand and growth. Indeed, the belief that devaluation 
is an effective tool for raising aggregate demand is wide-spread. The theoretical argument behind 
this view stems from the classic Mundell-Fleming model. In this framework, the real exchange 
rate has a positive effect on net exports, while domestic absorption is exchange rate inelastic. A 
real depreciation then boosts aggregate demand. This mechanism is sometimes also invoked by 
post-Keynesian economists (e.g. Bougrine and Seccareccia, 2004).  
This view has been challenged, however, by various authors. Alexander (1952), Diaz-Alejandro 
(1963), and Krugman and Taylor (1978) pointed out that devaluations can be contractionary for 
several reasons. Most importantly, it was argued that  
 
a) real devaluations may fail to increase net exports if the Marshall-Lerner condition (MLC) is 
not satisfied;2 and  
 
b) real devaluations are likely to redistribute income from workers to profit earners, who 
normally have a lower propensity to consume, and thereby depress consumption demand. 
 
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, adverse balance sheet effects from foreign-currency 
denominated private debt have been added to the list of contractionary channels (e.g. Krugman, 
1999). 3 Moreover, besides their short-run effects on output and growth, devaluations are likely 
to have an impact on external and domestic debt sustainability. The recent surge in foreign 
currency corporate debt in middle-income countries demands a stronger theoretical engagement 
with the driving forces of foreign-denominated external indebtedness, vulnerabilities to external 
shocks, and how currency devaluations affect debt sustainability. 
This paper employs a post-Kaleckian open economy model, firstly, to analyse how currency 
devaluations affect aggregate demand and capital accumulation in externally indebted economies 
in the short-run. Secondly, it models the driving forces of corporate foreign-currency debt in the 
medium-run, and identifies stabilising and destabilising factors. The focus is on small open 
economies with a fixed exchange rate.4 The post-Kaleckian framework captures several channels 
of currency devaluations that have been mentioned in the debate on (contractionary) 
devaluations, and thereby allows for a joint assessment of the relevant mechanisms. However, 
so far it has not accounted for issues of external indebtedness. The paper contributes to the 
existing literature by developing an extension of the post-Kaleckian open economy model that 
allows for an analysis of currency devaluations in economies with externally indebted private 
sectors. Firstly, the model captures balance sheet effects that arise from changes in the nominal 
  
value of foreign currency-denominated debt due to devaluation. Secondly, the paper analyses the 
dynamics of external and domestic corporate debt. It discusses how an economy may end up in 
a vicious cycle of foreign-currency indebtedness, and derives the conditions under which 
indebtedness becomes stable or unstable. Moreover, it shows how devaluations and external 
shocks affect the stability of debt in the medium-run. Thereby, the model brings several strands 
of the heterodox literature together: post-Kaleckian models of distribution and growth, Minskyan 
approaches to financial instability, and mainstream and post-Keynesian analyses of international 
finance. The main findings are that the existence of foreign currency-denominated debt means 
that devaluations are more likely to take a contractionary form, and that foreign interest rate 
hikes, and high illiquidity and risk premia compromise debt sustainability. Devaluations only 
stabilise debt ratios if they succeed in boosting domestic capital accumulation.  
The paper is structured as follows: The second part provides a brief review of the existing post-
Kaleckian literature on currency devaluations and external debt dynamics. The third part presents 
a short-run post-Kaleckian model with balance sheet effects and analyses the effect of 
devaluations on aggregate demand and growth. The fourth section discusses the medium- run 
dynamics and stability of domestic and external debt. The last section concludes. 
 
2  Currency devaluations and external debt dynamics in post-Kaleckian open economy 
models 
Open economy versions of the post-Kaleckian model typically focus on the relation between 
currency devaluations and functional income distribution, and their subsequent effects on 
aggregate demand and growth. While the profit share is fully exogenous in benchmark closed 
economy versions of the model, this assumption is relaxed in its open economy extensions. 
Blecker (1989) and Hein and Vogel (2008) point out that in an open economy the causes of a 
change in distribution, e.g. nominal appreciations/depreciations, changes in nominal wages or 
changes in the pricing mark-up, matter for the relationship between distribution and aggregate 
demand, due to different consequences for international competitiveness.  
Blecker (1989) argues that the pricing mark-up may be flexible in an open economy in which 
firms are subject to international competition. A reduction in international competitiveness, e.g. 
due to an increase in nominal wages, might force firms to reduce the mark-up in order to maintain 
their shares in international markets. By the same token, a real depreciation would ameliorate 
competitive pressures as it improves international price competitiveness, and thus allows for 
higher mark-ups. A real depreciation thus raises the profit share.  
Other authors (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Taylor; 2004, chap. 7; Lopez and Perrotini, 2006; 
Hein and Vogel, 2008) argue that real depreciations affect functional income distribution through 
imported raw materials. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker (1999; 2011) leave the overall 
effect of a depreciation-induced increase in the cost of imported inputs on the profit share open 
and argue that it depends on the relative ability of firms and workers to roll over the cost increase 
on prices and nominal wages, respectively. Taylor (2004, chap. 7), Lopez and Perrotini (2006), 
and Hein and Vogel (2008), in contrast, assume that nominal wages are inelastic with respect to 
the exchange rate so that a real depreciation always raises the profit share.  
Blecker (1999; 2011) and Taylor (2004, chap. 7) show that if the real devaluation raises the profit 
share, this in turn increases or decreases domestic demand depending on whether the 
expansionary effect on investment outweighs the contractionary effect on consumption. Second, 
  
the effect on the trade balance is positive, provided that the MLC holds. The overall effect on 
aggregate demand is thus ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the effects on 
consumption, investment, and net exports. 
Sasaki et al. (2013) and Rezai (2015) develop these models further. Sasaki et al. (2013) draw on 
Blecker (2011), but add feedback effects from the goods market to the labour market fuelling 
conflict inflation and inducing Kaldor-Verdoorn-type technical progress. However, in the steady 
state, the effect of a depreciation on the rate of capacity utilisation depends on the same 
mechanisms as in Blecker (2011) (Sasaki et al., 2013, pp. 701-702). Rezai (2015) analyses the 
effects of a devaluation in a two-country framework. In his model, a devaluation redistributes 
income from domestic to foreign workers due to higher import prices, since mark-ups are fixed 
and there is no conflict inflation. In such a set-up, devaluations can only be expansionary for the 
domestic economy if foreign workers have a significantly lower propensity to save than domestic 
workers and thereby compensate for the decline in domestic consumption demand.  
Despite these rich extensions of the post-Kaleckian open economy model, monetary aspects, 
especially those arising from external indebtedness, have been neglected. This omission is 
unsatisfactory given the recent surge in foreign currency corporate debt in middle-income 
countries (IMF, 2015, chap. 3; Chui et al., 2016). Foley's (2003) Minskyan open economy model 
is an exception; however, he focuses on interest rate and growth dynamics instead of balance 
sheet effects. Porcile et al. (2011) analyse the effects of different monetary policy rules on 
external debt sustainability in a post-Keynesian model. However, they do not take income 
distribution into account, and balance sheet effects are absent. Cline and Vernengo (2015) 
analyse external debt dynamics in semi-fixed exchange rate regimes but neither do they provide 
an analysis of the goods market nor propose a behavioural function for the change in external 
debt. 
 
3  The short-run model: Currency devaluations, aggregate demand, and growth  
Balance sheet effects 
The importance of balance sheet effects was fiercely brought to attention after the South East 
Asian crash in the late 1990s, during which the affected countries experienced severe drops in 
output after their currencies depreciated. These contractionary effects arose from large degrees 
of currency mismatch in the financial and business sector (Allen et al., 2002). The depreciation 
led to a nominal jump in foreign currency-denominated debt, which pushed many banks and 
firms into bankruptcy and caused a decline in capital formation. Econometric studies confirm 
that devaluations are more likely to have a negative effect on output and growth in countries with 
high external debt burdens (Galindo et al., 2003; Bebczuk et al., 2007; Blecker and Razmi, 2007; 
Janot et al., 2008).  
Theoretically, balance sheet effects have mostly been analysed within New Keynesian 
frameworks (Krugman, 1999; Aghion et al., 2000; Céspedes et al., 2004; Cook, 2004; Gertler et 
al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2007). Most of these models employ some version of Bernanke et 
al.'s (1999) financial accelerator model, in which the costs of external finance depend inversely 
on firms’ net worth because of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Due to 
incomplete information about the future profitability of investment projects, lenders incur agency 
costs which are increasing in the leverage ratio of the firm. This information problem translates 
into higher costs of capital for the borrowing firm. In the case of a foreign currency-indebted 
  
firm, a devaluation of the currency reduces its net worth, thereby increasing its costs of capital, 
which in turn depresses investment. This mechanism resembles Kalecki's (1937) ‘principle of 
increasing risk’ and Keynes’ (2013[1936], pp. 144–145) ‘borrowers’ and lenders’ risk’. 
However, the supply-side focus of New Keynesian models makes them rather unsuited for an 
analysis of devaluations as a short-run policy measure in demand-constrained recessionary 
economies. Moreover, distributional aspects and issues of external debt dynamics and 
sustainability are ignored in these approaches.  
 
The goods market 
The model put forth in this paper draws on existing post-Kaleckian open economy models5 but 
introduces foreign-currency denominated private debt and balance sheet effects. The model 
describes a small open economy that keeps its exchange rate fixed over the medium-run and is 
integrated into international financial markets through an open financial account.6 It is an 
economy whose currency does not function as an international reserve and is of lower quality. 
As a consequence, foreign debt can only be obtained in foreign currency – a phenomenon which 
is often called ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen et al., 2007).7  
The model economy consists of one sector that produces a homogenous good (Y) using capital 
(K) and labour, which can be used for consumption and investment. For simplicity, there is no 
depreciation of the capital stock and no overhead labour. The technical coefficients of labour (a) 
and capital (v) are assumed to be constant in the short-run, so there is no substitution between 
capital and labour and no technical progress. There are unutilised capacities and unemployment 
(or an elastic labour supply). The focus of the model is on the short-run, so that the rate of 
capacity utilisation (u) functions as an endogenous adjustment variable, implying that there is 
quantity adjustment if demand changes. For the sake of simplicity, there is no government sector, 
no inflation, and the open economy is small, so that all foreign variables are exogenously given. 
There is no substitution between the imported good and the domestic good.  
Pricing, the real exchange rate, the mark-up, the wage and profit share are given by equations 
(1)-(5): 
 
(1)  𝑝 = (1 + 𝑚)𝑤𝑎;  𝑚 > 0    
(2)  𝑒𝑟 ≡  
𝑒
𝑝
 
(3)  𝑚 = 𝑚(𝑒𝑟 , 𝛿, 𝜂);  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑒𝑟
 ⋚ 0;
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛿
> 0; 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜂
<  0  
(4)  (1 − 𝜋) ≡
𝑤𝑎
𝑝
=
1
1+𝑚(𝑒𝑟,𝜂,𝛿)
 
(5)  𝜋 ≡
𝑅
𝑝𝑌
=  
𝑚(𝑒𝑟,𝜂,𝛿)
1+𝑚(𝑒𝑟,𝜂,𝛿)
  
 
In incompletely competitive markets, prices (𝑝) are set by firms who charge a mark-up (𝑚) on 
nominal unit labour costs (𝑤𝑎) which are constant up to full capacity utilisation. I abstract from 
raw material inputs for simplicity. The real exchange rate (𝑒𝑟) is defined in equation (2), setting 
the foreign price level to unity. Note that the nominal exchange rate (𝑒) is defined as the domestic 
price of foreign currency, so that a depreciation implies an increase in the exchange rate. 
Following Blecker (1989), the real exchange rate affects the mark-up through its effect on 
international competitiveness. However, capturing another idea from Blecker (2011), the 
  
distributional effect of a real depreciation is unclear a priori and depends on the relative 
bargaining power of firms (𝛿) and workers (𝜂). If the bargaining power of firms is larger (𝛿 > 𝜂), 
a depreciation raises the mark-up (
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑒𝑟
> 0) as firms are successful in using the leeway that has 
been created by the improvement in their international competitiveness for raising the mark-up. 
If, however, trade unions are very strong and/or nominal wages are indexed to the exchange rate 
 (𝛿 < 𝜂), a real depreciation might lead to aggressive nominal wage increases, which 
compromise firms’ international competitiveness and force them to reduce the mark-up. In this 
case, a real devaluation reduces the mark-up (
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑒𝑟
< 0). According to Blecker (2011), the case 
of a positive relation between the real exchange rate and the mark-up appears to be empirically 
more likely.8 The mark-up fully determines the profit share (𝜋) and the wage share (1 − 𝜋), 
where 𝑅 denotes total profits.  
Table 1 presents the balance sheet matrix of the model. There are four economic sectors: workers, 
firms, banks, and the external sector. Workers neither hold assets nor liabilities. Firms’ liabilities 
consist of foreign credit denominated in foreign currency (𝑒𝐵𝑓) and loans denominated in 
domestic currency (𝐵). For simplicity, there is no equity (the net worth of the firm sector, 𝑁𝑊𝐹, 
is kept within the firm sector). 
 
Table 1: Balance sheet matrix 
 Workers Firms Banks External ∑ 
Fixed Capital  +𝑝𝐾  +𝐾𝑓 +𝑝𝐾 + 𝐾𝑓 
Foreign currency- 
denominated 
foreign loans 
 −𝑒𝐵𝑓  +𝑒𝐵𝑓 0 
Domestic currency-
denominated loans 
 −𝐵 +𝐵  0 
Domestic currency-
denominated 
deposits of 
foreigners 
  −𝐷 +𝐷 0 
∑ (Net worth) 0 +𝑁𝑊𝐹 0 +𝑁𝑊𝐸𝑋𝑇 𝑝𝐾 + 𝐾
𝑓 = 𝑁𝑊𝐹+𝑁𝑊𝐸𝑋𝑇 
Note: Plus signs denote assets, while minus signs indicate liabilities The superscript f denotes foreign variables. The 
subscripts F and EXT stand for firms and external, respectively. p: domestic price level; e: nominal exchange rate.  
 
Banks are pure intermediaries which give loans in domestic currency to domestic firms (𝐵) and 
take deposits only from abroad (𝐷), since workers do not save and firms retain their net profits.  
The external sector holds the bonds that have been issued by domestic firms in foreign currency 
(𝑒𝐵𝑓), and holds deposits (𝐷) at domestic banks in domestic currency. Subtracting liabilities 
from assets yields the net worth (𝑁𝑊) of the respective sectors. If 𝑒𝐵𝑓 + 𝐵 > 𝑝𝐾, the domestic 
firm sector faces balance-sheet insolvency. Note that a country can also be in a positive net 
foreign asset position if 𝑒𝐵𝑓 + 𝐵 < 0. 𝐵 and/or 𝑒𝐵𝑓 would then be liabilities of the external 
sector. I restrict the focus to the case where 𝑒𝐵𝑓 is positive, but 𝐵 may become negative. In this 
  
case, domestic banks would lend to foreigners, while domestic firms hold deposits at domestic 
banks. 
Further we have:  
 
(6)  
𝑒𝐵𝑓
𝑝𝐾
≡ 𝑒𝑟𝜆 
(7)  
𝐵
𝑝𝐾
≡ 𝜏  
(8)  𝑟 ≡
𝑅
𝑝𝐾
≡  
𝜋𝑢
𝑣
 
(9)  𝑠 ≡  
𝑆
𝑝𝐾
=  𝑟 − 𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝜆 − 𝑖𝜏 =  
𝜋𝑢
𝑣
−  𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝜆 − 𝑖𝜏 
(10)  𝑁𝑋 ≡  𝑝𝑋 − 𝑒𝑀 
(11)  𝑏 ≡  
𝑁𝑋
𝑝𝐾
≡  
𝑝𝑋− 𝑒𝑀 
𝑝𝐾
= 𝑏0𝑢
𝑓 + 𝑏1𝑒𝑟 − 𝑏2𝑢;  𝑏0, 𝑏2 > 0, 𝑏1 ⋚ 0  
 
The external debt in foreign currency to capital ratio (𝑒𝑟𝜆), and the domestic debt in domestic 
currency to capital ratio (𝜏) are defined in equations (6) and (7), respectively. The profit rate (𝑟) 
in equation (8) can be decomposed into the product of the profit share (𝜋), the rate of capacity 
utilisation (𝑢), and the inverse of capital productivity, the capital coefficient (𝑣). Workers and 
banks do not save, whereas firms save all their net income, i.e. their profits after interest 
payments on domestic and foreign credit. It is assumed that lending rates are equal to deposit 
rates, so that banks do not make any profits. Given that deposits are only held by foreigners, all 
interest payments go abroad. Total domestic saving is then given by firms’ saving (equation 9), 
where 𝑖𝑓 represents the foreign and  𝑖 the domestic interest rate. 
Equation (10) defines net exports in domestic currency (𝑁𝑋). Equation (11) is a behavioural 
function that relates the net export ratio (𝑏) to the foreign rate of capacity utilisation (𝑢𝑓), the 
real exchange rate, and the domestic rate of capacity utilisation. The foreign rate of capacity 
utilisation is assumed to improve the trade balance as it translates into export demand for the 
home country, so the parameter 𝑏0 is positive. The inclusion of the foreign rate of capacity 
utilisation, however, requires that the domestic and foreign capital stock grow at the same rate – 
an assumption that might not be satisfied over longer periods. Second, whether the effect of an 
increase in the real exchange rate on the trade balance is positive depends on whether the MLC 
holds, which is captured by parameter 𝑏1.
9 The larger the price elasticities of import and export 
demand, the larger 𝑏1. Third, the domestic rate of capacity utilisation has a negative effect on 
the trade balance, as an increase in domestic demand will increase import demand.  
Equations (12), (13) and (14) specify the rate of investment, the goods market equilibrium 
condition, and the Keynesian stability condition. 
 
(12)  𝑔 ≡  
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝑔0 + 𝑔1𝑢 + 𝑔2𝜋 − 𝑔3𝑒𝑟𝜆;        𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3 > 0 
(13)  𝑔 + 𝑏 = 𝑠 + 𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝜆 + 𝑖𝜏 = 𝑟 
(14)  
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑢
−  
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑢
−  
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑢
 > 0 ⇔  
𝜋
𝑣
+ 𝑏2 >  𝑔1 
 
The first three components of the investment function (12) are standard in the post-Kaleckian 
model. First, investment is affected by a shift parameter (𝑔0) which captures 'animal spirits', i.e. 
  
the state of business confidence, changes in expectations, etc. Second, investment is assumed to 
be positively related to the rate of capacity utilisation. This is because the current rate of capacity 
utilisation functions as an indicator of aggregate demand. A high rate of capacity utilisation 
induces firms to expand their productive capacities in order to be able to meet demand in the 
future. Third, the profit share enters the investment function. It is assumed that the profit share 
has a positive effect on investment; first, because it functions as a proxy for expected 
profitability, and second because retained profits constitute internal finance. Internal finance is 
often a pre-condition for access to credit in financial markets with uncertainty and asymmetric 
information as discussed previously. Fourth, balance sheet effects enter the model through the 
investment function. Similar to Krugman (1999), investment expenditures are negatively 
affected by the external-debt-to-capital ratio. From a post-Keynesian perspective, this 
mechanism is due to ‘borrower’s risk’, which is the subjective risk of illiquidity and bankruptcy 
of the entrepreneur due to the possibility of lower than expected cash flows despite fixed payment 
obligations (Kalecki, 1937; Keynes, 2013[1936], pp.144–145). Foreign-currency denominated 
debt especially raises borrower’s risk because it implies a currency mismatch: firms’ cash flows 
are denominated in domestic currency, while some of their liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency. Firms thus bear severe exchange rate risk. A sudden devaluation not only decreases 
their net worth but also makes the foreign currency they need to repay their debt more 
expensive.10 
The open economy goods market equilibrium condition is given by equation (13). It accounts 
for interest payments on external debt and deposits of foreigners, which count as leakages along 
with domestic saving. Lastly, it is assumed that the Keynesian stability condition (14) is satisfied, 
which requires that the marginal effect of an increase in the rate of capacity utilisation on the 
saving and net export rate is larger than the respective effect on the investment rate.11 
The transaction flow matrix of the model is depicted in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Transaction flow matrix 
 Workers Firms Banks External ∑ 
  Current Capital Current Capital   
Consumption −𝐶 +𝐶     0 
Investment  +𝑝𝐼 −𝑝𝐼    0 
Wages  +𝑊 −𝑊     0 
Net profits   −𝑅𝑁𝑒𝑡 +𝑅𝑁𝑒𝑡    0 
Imports  −𝑒𝑀    +𝑒𝑀 0 
Exports  +𝑝𝑋    −𝑝𝑋 0 
Interest payments on foreign 
currency-denominated 
foreign loans 
 −𝑒𝑖𝑓𝐵𝑓    +𝑒𝑖𝑓𝐵𝑓  
Interest payments on 
domestic currency-
denominated loans 
 −𝑖𝐵  +𝑖𝐵   0 
Interest payments on 
domestic currency 
denominated loans of 
foreigners 
   −𝑖𝐷  +𝑖𝐷 0 
  
Change in foreign currency-
denominated foreign debt 
  +𝑒𝐵 ?̇?   −𝑒𝐵 ?̇? 0 
Change in domestic 
currency-denominated loans 
  +?̇?  −?̇?  0 
Change in domestic-currency 
denominated deposits of 
foreigners 
    +?̇? −?̇? 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: A plus sign indicates a source of funds, while a minus sign denotes a use of funds. The rows display where 
the different components of national income are earned and spent, and the columns constitute sectoral budget 
constraints. The superscript f denotes foreign variables. A dot over a variable represents its derivative with respect 
to time (?̇? =
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
). p: domestic price level; e: nominal exchange rate; i: interest rate. 
 
It is worthwhile taking a closer look at the budget constraint of the firm sector, which can be 
found in its capital account column: 
 
𝑝𝐼 ≡ 𝑅𝑁𝑒𝑡 + 𝑒𝐵 ?̇? + ?̇? ≡ 𝑅 − 𝑒𝑖𝑓𝐵𝑓 − 𝑖𝐵 + 𝑒𝐵 ?̇? + ?̇? 
 
Firms can finance their investment expenditures either through net profits (𝑅𝑁𝑒𝑡), by taking out 
a loan in domestic currency (?̇?), or by issuing bonds denominated in foreign currency (𝑒𝐵 ?̇?). 
Firms have a preference for foreign debt because the interest rate on external debt (𝑖𝑓) is 
normally lower than the domestic rate (𝑖) (see section 4). The higher domestic interest rate also 
motivates foreigners to hold domestic-currency denominated deposits at domestic banks. If firms 
choose the level of investment expenditures, their saving, and their issuance of foreign currency-
denominated bonds independently, domestic lending (?̇?) has to accommodate. It absorbs the 
total expenditures of firms that exceed their retained profits, and that are not already financed 
through foreign currency-denominated debt. The dynamics of domestic currency-denominated 
debt are then given by:  
 
?̇? ≡ 𝑝𝐼 − 𝑅 + 𝑒𝑖𝑓𝐵𝑓 + 𝑖𝐵 − 𝑒𝐵 ?̇? ≡ 𝑝𝐼 − 𝑅𝑁𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝐵 ?̇? 
 
Note that the endogeneity of domestic lending does not imply that there are no credit supply 
constraints. Credit rationing may occur and is captured by a lower demand for credit for higher 
levels of external debt through the investment function (12). Moreover, higher stocks of external 
debt come with higher default risks, which translate into higher risk premia on interest rates (see 
below). 
 
Exchange rate regime and interest rate determination 
The central bank keeps the exchange rate fixed in the short- and medium-run, perhaps because 
it seeks to improve the trust in the currency or to reduce economic uncertainty. Occasional 
currency devaluations enacted by the central bank are a possibility agents are aware of, but they 
cannot anticipate them. Thus, agents do not hold concrete expectations about future changes in 
the exchange rate. Foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes as the domestic currency 
is of lower quality. Moreover, agents may be worried about default and devaluation risks. The 
domestic interest rate, therefore, has to offer a monetary premium to incentivise foreigners to 
  
hold deposits with domestic banks. Under these circumstances, the central bank cannot set the 
domestic interest rate below the level determined by international arbitrage conditions without 
inducing a capital flight that is unsustainable, given that foreign reserves are limited.12 It is thus 
forced to set a domestic interest rate that is consistent with uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) 
plus a premium that reflects risks and the low quality of the currency:13 
 
(15) 𝑖 = 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌;  𝜌 > 0   
 
where 𝑖 is the domestic rate of interest, 𝑖𝐵
𝑓
is the exogenous foreign base rate, and 𝜌 the premium 
domestic currency assets have to offer to make foreign investors indifferent between foreign and 
domestic assets.14   
What determines the premium? First, there is an exogenous component that compensates for the 
low quality and liquidity of the currency due to its low position in the international currency 
hierarchy (i.e. it is neither an international means of payment, nor unit of credit contracts, nor 
store of value). Second, the premium is affected by the total stock of foreign currency-
denominated external debt (Kaltenbrunner, 2015; Rocha and Oreiro, 2013). Foreign depositors 
may be worried about unpredictable future devaluations due to unsustainable external debt 
burdens. Devaluations directly translate into capital losses for foreign depositors. Moreover, 
being aware of the possibility of balance sheet effects, foreign depositors interpret a high burden 
of external debt as a high risk of default. Using a simple linear function for the illiquidity and 
risk premium, 𝜌 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑒𝑟𝜆, we get: 
 
(15’) 𝑖 = 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑒𝑟𝜆;  𝜌0, 𝜌1 > 0 
 
where 𝜌0 is the illiquidity premium and 𝜌1 is the sensitivity of the risk premium with respect to 
foreign currency-denominated external debt. 
By the same token, the interest rate on foreign-currency debt includes a premium to compensate 
for default risks due to unsustainable debt burdens. However, in contrast to domestic debt, there 
is no illiquidity premium.  
 
(16) 𝑖𝑓 = 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌1
𝑓𝑒𝑟𝜆;  𝜌1
𝑓 > 0 
 
Currency devaluations, aggregate demand, and growth 
Making use of equations (9), (11), (12) and (13), the goods market equilibrium rate of capacity 
utilisation is given by: 
 
(17)  𝑢∗ =
𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+𝑏1𝑒𝑟+𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋−𝑔3𝑒𝑟𝜆
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
 
 
An equilibrium rate of profit can be derived by plugging (17) into (8): 
 
(18)  𝑟∗ =
𝜋
𝑣
(𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+𝑏1𝑒𝑟+𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋−𝑔3𝑒𝑟𝜆)
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
 
  
 
The equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is obtained by substituting equation (17) into (12):  
 
(19) 𝑔∗ =
𝑔1(𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+𝑏1𝑒𝑟)+(𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋− 𝑔3𝑒𝑟𝜆)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2)
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
 
 
Lastly, using (17) and (11), the equilibrium trade balance is given by: 
 
(20) 𝑏∗ =  
(
𝜋
𝑣
−𝑔1)(𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+ 𝑏1𝑒𝑟)−𝑏2(𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋−𝑔3𝜆𝑒𝑟)
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
  
 
Suppose the central bank decides to adjust the peg by devaluing the currency, perhaps in order 
to boost aggregate demand. It announces a new real exchange rate target, which is instantly 
reached.15 The effect of a real devaluation on the equilibrium rate of capacity utilisation is then 
given by: 
 
(21)  
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟
 =
𝑏1+
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
(𝑔2−
𝑢
𝑣
)−𝑔3𝜆  
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
⋚ 0 
⇒
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟
> 0,   𝑖𝑓: 𝑏1 +
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
(𝑔2 −
𝑢
𝑣
) − 𝑔3𝜆 > 0  
 
The denominator contains the Keynesian stability condition, which is assumed to be positive. 
The overall sign of the derivative thus depends on the numerator. Three distinct effects can be 
distinguished. The first term in the numerator captures the effect of a devaluation on the trade 
balance. The coefficient 𝑏1 can be positive or negative, depending on whether the MLC is 
satisfied or not.16 This makes the sign of the first term in the numerator ambiguous.  
The second term captures the effect of a devaluation on the profit share. It can be positive or 
negative, depending on the relative bargaining power of workers and firms, but it is expected 
that the effect is normally positive. The term in brackets captures whether domestic aggregate 
demand is wage- or profit-led. If it is profit-led, the term is positive because a redistribution in 
favour of profit earners boosts investment more than it depresses consumption. A devaluation 
then has an expansionary effect on domestic absorption if it raises the profit share. If, however, 
the term in brackets is negative so that the economy is domestically wage-led, and the 
devaluation raises the profit share, the devaluation depresses domestic absorption. 
Contractionary effects on domestic absorption arise when the devaluation raises the profit share 
but the domestic demand-regime is wage-led, and vice versa.  
A major novelty for the post-Kaleckian approach is the balance sheet effect, which is captured 
by the third term. External debt in foreign currency exercises an unambiguously negative effect 
on the rate of capacity utilisation, which is the stronger, the higher the external debt ratio (𝜆), 
and the larger the sensitivity of investment with respect to foreign currency-denominated debt 
(𝑔3). Balance sheet effects increase the overall likelihood of contractionary devaluations, as they 
potentially turn the numerator negative.  
The model can also be used to analyse the effect of a real devaluation on the equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation: 
  
 
(22)  
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟
=
𝑔1(𝑏1−
𝑢
𝑣
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
)+(𝑔2
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
−𝑔3𝜆)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2) 
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
⋚ 0 
⇒
𝑑𝑔∗ 
𝑑𝑒𝑟
> 0,   𝑖𝑓: 𝑔1 (𝑏1 −
𝑢
𝑣
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
) + (𝑔2
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
− 𝑔3𝜆) (
𝜋
𝑣
+ 𝑏2) > 0 
 
The same mechanisms that determine the overall effect on aggregate demand are at work in the 
determination of the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation. However, the effects on domestic 
investment get a stronger weight than the effects on net exports and consumption (remember that 
we assume 
𝜋
𝑣
+ 𝑏2 > 𝑔1), so that balance sheet effect have a stronger impact on growth than on 
demand. 
Finally, the effect of a devaluation on the equilibrium trade balance can be examined: 
 
(23) 
𝑑𝑏∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟
=
𝑏1(
𝜋
𝑣
−𝑔1)−𝑏2[
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
(𝑔2−
𝑢
𝑣
)−𝑔3𝜆]
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
⋚ 0 
⇒
𝑑𝑏∗ 
𝑑𝑒𝑟
> 0,   𝑖𝑓: 𝑏1 (
𝜋
𝑣
− 𝑔1) − 𝑏2 [
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
(𝑔2 −
𝑢
𝑣
) − 𝑔3𝜆] > 0 
 
Again, the overall effect depends on the numerator. Two channels are relevant here: the price 
competitiveness channel captured by parameter  𝑏1, and the domestic demand channel which is 
represented by 𝑏2. The first channel depends on the MLC and the closed economy Keynesian 
stability condition (
𝜋
𝑣
− 𝑔1 > 0). Provided that the latter is satisfied, the direction of the price 
competitiveness channel is given by the MLC. The second channel depends on the effect of a 
devaluation on domestic absorption. If the devaluation raises domestic absorption, for example 
because the economy is profit-led and balance sheet effects are weak, its effect on the equilibrium 
trade balance may be negative. If, however, the domestic economy is wage-led and the 
devaluation raises the profit share, it suppresses domestic absorption, so that its effect on the 
equilibrium trade balance may be positive. It is thus possible that a devaluation improves the 
equilibrium trade balance by depressing import demand, even if the MLC is not satisfied.  
The analysis shows that the overall effect of a real devaluation on aggregate demand, growth, 
and the trade balance is ambiguous, and depends on the individual effects on net exports, 
consumption and investment. Introducing balance sheet effects into the Kaleckian model adds a 
negative effect on planned investment expenditures, which makes overall contractionary effects 
on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation and growth more likely. This effect is predicted 
to be strong in countries that are heavily indebted in foreign currency. The different channels are 
visualised in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Causation graph of the effect of a real devaluation on aggregate demand 
and growth 
 
 
 
Real devaluation (↑ 𝑒𝑟) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: MLC: Marshall-Lerner condition.  
 
4  The medium-run model: Dynamics and (in)stability of domestic and external debt  
The dynamics of domestic and external debt  
From the point of view of external creditors, new credit is typically granted when the domestic 
economy is booming. Strong capital inflows into developing and emerging market countries 
during boom phases are indeed a familiar phenomenon. Domestic firms, in turn, use external 
credit in foreign currency in order to finance a share 𝜙 of their total nominal investment 
expenditures: 
 
(24) 𝑒𝐵𝑓̇ = 𝜙𝑝𝐼;      0 < 𝜙 ≤ 1 
 
The preference for foreign currency debt, 𝜙, is unlikely to be constant. Firms often prefer 
external debt simply because it is cheaper (Williamson, 2005, chap. 4). 𝜙 then becomes a 
function of the differential between the interest rates on foreign-currency and domestic-currency 
debt: 𝜙 = 𝜙(𝑖 − 𝑖𝑓). The bigger the differential, the larger the propensity to finance investment 
out of foreign currency-denominated external debt. The differential is given by: 
 
(25) 𝑖 − 𝑖𝑓 = 𝜌0 + (𝜌1 − 𝜌1
𝑓)𝑒𝑟𝜆 ⋛ 0   
 
It can be positive or negative, but will typically be positive in economies with low quality 
currencies due to high illiquidity premia (𝜌0).    
Net exports (𝑏) 
↑ if MLC condition satisfied 
0 or ↓ if MLC violated 
 
Profit share (𝜋) 
↑ if firms more powerful than 
workers 
↓ if workers are more powerful 
than firms 
Saving (𝑠) 
↑ if profit share increases 
↓ if profit share falls 
 
Investment (𝑔) 
↑ if profit share increases and 
distributional effect 
dominates balance sheet 
effect 
↓ if profit share decreases or 
balance sheet effect 
dominates  
 
Aggregate demand (↑↓ 𝑢∗) and growth (↑↓ 𝑔∗) 
External debt in foreign 
currency (↑ 𝑒𝑟𝜆) 
  
The propensity to finance investment out of foreign currency-denominated external debt then 
becomes a function of the illiquidity and risk premia: 𝜙 = 𝜙[𝜌0 + (𝜌1 − 𝜌1
𝑓)𝑒𝑟𝜆]. A simple 
linearization yields: 𝜙 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑒𝑟𝜆. We then have: 
 
(24’) 𝑒𝐵𝑓̇ = (𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑒𝑟𝜆)𝑝𝐼;      0 < 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑒𝑟𝜆 ≤ 1 and 𝜙1 ⋛ 0 
 
The parameter 𝜙0 is composed of an independent preference for external debt plus the illiquidity 
premium 𝜌0, while the parameter 𝜙1 expresses the sensitivity of the propensity to finance 
investment out of foreign currency-denominated external debt with respect to external debt. The 
sensitivities of the risk premia with respect to external debt, 𝜌1 and 𝜌1
𝑓
, are thus incorporated in 
𝜙1. I shall assume that the independent propensity to finance investment out of external debt is 
constant in the medium-run, and that the sensitivity of 𝜙 with respect to the premia is strong (i.e. 
close to unity), so that changes in 𝜙 are mainly determined by changes in the illiquidity and risk 
premia. Hence, an increase in the illiquidity premium translates into a higher propensity to 
finance investment out of foreign currency-denominated external debt because it makes domestic 
loans more expensive. The effect of a shock to external debt on 𝜙 depends on the relative 
sensitivities of the foreign and domestic interest rate on debt. If 𝜌1 > 𝜌1
𝑓
, an increase in external 
debt will raise the propensity (𝜙1 > 0). In this case, there is a vicious cycle of external debt, in 
the sense that an increase in foreign currency-denominated debt accelerates the issuance of new 
foreign currency debt. Considering that a devaluation will always involve a capital loss for 
foreign investors in the case of domestic currency debt, while it only increases the likelihood of 
default on both kinds of debt, it is not unlikely that 𝜌1 is larger than 𝜌1
𝑓
. However, if 𝜌1 = 𝜌1
𝑓
, 
there will be no effect of a shock to external debt on debt dynamics (𝜙1 = 0), and in the rather 
unlikely case of 𝜌1 < 𝜌1
𝑓
, an increase in external debt reduces the rate of change of external debt 
𝜙1 < 0). I assume that 𝜙1is normally positive.  
The dynamic equation for the external debt in foreign currency-to-capital ratio can be obtained 
by totally differentiating equation (6) with respect to time: 
 
(26) 
𝑑(
𝑒𝐵𝑓
𝑝𝐾
)
𝑑𝑡
≡ (
𝑒𝐵𝑓
𝑝𝐾
)
̇
≡ 𝑒𝑟𝜆̇ ≡
𝑒𝐵𝑓̇
𝑝𝐾
+  𝑒𝑟𝜆(𝑒?̂? − 𝑔)  
 
The goods market has already reached its short-run equilibrium (𝑔 = 𝑔∗), and the exchange rate 
is fixed (𝑒?̂? = 0). Inserting (24’) into (26) then yields the following differential equation: 
 
(27) 𝑒𝑟𝜆̇ = 𝑔
∗[𝜙0 + 𝑒𝑟𝜆(𝜙1 − 1)] 
 
The ratio of domestic currency-denominated debt is the second state variable. Taking the time 
derivative of the debt in domestic currency to capital ratio (7), we obtain: 
 
(28) 
𝑑(
𝐵
𝑝𝐾
)
𝑑𝑡
≡ (
𝐵
𝑝𝐾
)
̇
≡ ?̇? =  
?̇?
𝑝𝐾
− 𝜏𝑔 − 𝜏?̂? 
 
  
Making use of the firm sector budget constraint (?̇? ≡ 𝑝𝐼 − 𝑅 + 𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐵𝑓 + 𝑖𝐵 − 𝑒𝐵 ?̇?), the interest 
rate equations (15’) and (16), equation (24’) for the dynamics of external debt, and recalling that 
inflation is assumed away, we get: 
 
(29) ?̇? =  𝜏(𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑒𝑟𝜆 − 𝑔
∗) + 𝑔∗(1 − 𝜙0 − 𝜙1𝑒𝑟𝜆) + (𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌1
𝑓𝑒𝑟𝜆)𝑒𝑟𝜆 − 𝑟
∗   
 
Stability of debt at the steady state 
A non-trivial steady state of the external debt in foreign currency ratio (27) arises if:  
 
(30) 𝑒𝑟𝜆
∗
|𝑒𝑟𝜆̇ =0
=
𝜙0
1−𝜙1
 
 
𝜙0 has to be positive and 𝜙1 must be smaller than unity to ensure the existence of external debt. 
Under these conditions, the external debt in foreign currency ratio is positive. We can see that a 
devaluation has no effect on it in the steady state. The steady state external debt ratio is solely 
determined by the propensity to finance investment through foreign-currency denominated debt, 
which in turn is determined by the illiquidity and risk premia. A higher illiquidity premium, e.g. 
because of a loss of trust in the domestic currency, as well as a higher sensitivity of the domestic 
interest rate premium with respect to external debt, e.g. because of stronger concerns about 
devaluation and default risks, raise the steady state external debt ratio. A higher sensitivity of 
risk of foreign investors with respect to foreign-currency debt, however, reduces the steady state 
debt ratio.  
The steady state of the domestic currency-denominated debt ratio is given by: 
 
(31) 𝜏∗|?̇?=0 =
𝑔∗(1−𝜙0−𝜙1𝑒𝑟𝜆)+(𝑖𝐵
𝑓
+𝜌1
𝑓
𝑒𝑟𝜆)𝑒𝑟𝜆−𝑟
∗
𝑔∗−𝑖𝐵
𝑓
−𝜌0−𝜌1𝑒𝑟𝜆
 
 
This steady state debt ratio can become positive or negative. As will be demonstrated below, the 
denominator must be positive for stability. The steady state domestic debt ratio then becomes 
positive if the share of investment that is financed through domestic debt plus interest payments 
on external debt exceeds the profit rate. The debt ratio can also become negative if profits exceed 
interest payments on external debt plus expenditures on investment that are not financed through 
external debt. Firms then save more than they spend and hold deposits with domestic banks. 
Equations (27) and (29) form a two-dimensional dynamic system. The Jacobian matrix of the 
system, evaluated at the steady state, is given by:17 
 
(32) 𝑱(𝑒𝑟𝜆
∗∗, 𝜏∗∗) = [
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆̇
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆̇
𝜕𝜏
𝜕?̇?
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆
𝜕?̇?
𝜕𝜏
] = [
 𝐽11  𝐽12
 𝐽21  𝐽22
], 
 
where 
𝐽11 = 𝑔
∗∗(𝜙1 − 1) 
𝐽12 = 0 
  
𝐽21 =
𝜕𝑔∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆
(1 − 𝜙0 −
𝜙1𝜙0
1 − 𝜙1
− 𝜏∗∗) + 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 +
2𝜌1
𝑓𝜙0
1 − 𝜙1
+ 𝜏∗∗𝜌1 − 𝑔
∗∗𝜙1 −
𝜕𝑟∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟𝜆
 
𝐽22 = 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 +
𝜌1𝜙0
1 − 𝜙1
− 𝑔∗∗ 
 
The necessary and sufficient stability conditions for of a two-dimensional system of differential 
equations are: 
 
𝑡𝑟(𝑱) = 𝐽11 + 𝐽22 < 0 
𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑱) = 𝐽11 𝐽22 −  𝐽12𝐽21 > 0 
 
Stability of the present system is given if and only if both diagonal elements of the Jacobian 
matrix are negative. The first element is: 
 
(33) 𝐽11 = 𝑔
∗∗(𝜙1 − 1) = {
𝑔1(𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+𝑏1𝑒𝑟)+(𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋− 
𝑔3𝜙0
1−𝜙1
)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2)
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
} (𝜙1 − 1) 
⇒ 𝐽11 < 0,   𝑖𝑓: 𝑔
∗∗(𝜙1 − 1) < 0 
 
As long as the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is positive and 𝜙1 < 1, this element is 
negative. Instability may arise during recessions, which could occur because animal spirits (𝑔0) 
turn negative or export demand (𝑏0𝑢
𝑓) collapses, while other driving forces of capital 
accumulation such as export competitiveness (𝑏1𝑒𝑟) are weak, and balance sheet effects (
𝑔3𝜙0
1−𝜙1
) 
are strong. Instability could also occur if the propensity to finance investment out of foreign 
currency-denominated debt with respect to external debt is larger than unity (𝜙1 > 1), i.e. the 
risk premium on domestic-currency debt is very sensitive towards external debt, while the risk 
premium on foreign-currency debt is rather inelastic. Such a situation may occur shortly before 
currency crises, when foreign investors are nervous and interpret a small increase in external 
indebtedness as a strong predictor of a future devaluation, so that the central bank must respond 
by raising the interest rate. This response, however, may compromise debt sustainability. 
Currency crises and banking crisis indeed often go hand in hand (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
In normal times, however, 𝐽11 should be negative. 
The second element of the diagonal is: 
 
(34) 𝐽22 = 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 +
𝜌1𝜙0
1−𝜙1
− 𝑔∗∗ 
       ⟺ 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 +
𝜌1𝜙0
1−𝜙1
− {
𝑔1(𝑏0𝑢
𝑓+𝑏1𝑒𝑟)+(𝑔0+𝑔2𝜋− 
𝑔3𝜙0
1−𝜙1
)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2)
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
}        
 ⇒ 𝐽22 < 0,   𝑖𝑓: 𝑔
∗∗ > 𝑖 ⇔  𝑔∗∗ > 𝑖𝐵
𝑓 + 𝜌0 +
𝜌1𝜙0
1−𝜙1
   
 
This element is negative as long as the equilibrium steady state rate of capital accumulation 
exceeds the domestic interest rate. This stability condition resembles earlier findings of the 
literature on public debt sustainability, which demonstrated that the economy can grow out of 
  
the public debt burden if the condition 𝑔 > 𝑖 is satisfied (see Taylor, 2004, chap. 6). However, 
meeting the stability condition for the non-reserve currency economy of this model is more 
difficult, as the domestic interest rate is determined by factors that are partly beyond the control 
of domestic authorities. A foreign interest rate hike, for instance, may destabilise the system and 
induce a debt crisis – a familiar scenario in developing countries (Cline and Vernengo, 2015). 
The Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s is a prime examples of such a disaster (Errunza 
and Ghalbouni, 1986). Another potentially destabilising factor is a sudden increase in the 
illiquidity premium (𝜌0), e.g. because of a loss of confidence in the domestic currency or because 
of a rise in international liquidity preference (Dow, 1999). Lastly, a high sensitivity of the 
domestic interest rate premium with respect to the steady state external debt ratio (𝜌1) and a high 
debt ratio (
𝜙0
1−𝜙1
) also compromise stability.   
How does a devaluation affect the stability of the system? A devaluation has a stabilising effect 
if it diminishes the diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix. Taking the total derivatives of 𝐽11 
and 𝐽22with respect to the real exchange rate, we find: 
 
(35) 
𝑑𝐽11
𝑑𝑒𝑟
= [
𝑔1(𝑏1−
𝑢
𝑣
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
)+(𝑔2
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2) 
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
] (𝜙1 − 1) ⋚ 0 
(36) 
𝑑𝐽22
𝑑𝑒𝑟
= −
𝑔1(𝑏1−
𝑢
𝑣
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
)+(𝑔2
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑒𝑟
)(
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2) 
𝜋
𝑣
+𝑏2−𝑔1
 ⋚ 0 
 
We see that a devaluation can have a stabilising effect on the external debt in foreign currency 
ratio under similar conditions under which a devaluation increases the equilibrium rate of growth 
(cf. equation 22). A difference is that the balance sheet effect arising from external indebtedness 
in foreign currency is gone at the steady state since the steady state external debt ratio is fixed 
by the parameters that determine the propensity to finance investment through external debt 
(
𝜙0
1−𝜙1
). Contractionary devaluations are therefore less likely in the steady state. To conclude, 
whenever a devaluation in the stable steady state succeeds in boosting capital accumulation, it 
also improves stability of the debt ratios. This holds despite the assumption that external debt 
dynamics are driven by capital accumulation. In contrast, devaluations that depress investment 
compromise debt sustainability. Note that this can happen even if the MLC is satisfied, so that a 
devaluation may improve the trade balance but induce a debt crisis.  
 
5  Conclusion 
The paper has firstly addressed the question of how currency devaluations affect aggregate 
demand and capital accumulation in the short-run in small open economies with a fixed exchange 
rate and foreign-currency denominated corporate debt. The post-Kaleckian model shows that 
devaluations induce several mechanisms that affect aggregate demand and growth, and the 
overall outcome cannot be established a priori. Devaluations are likely to induce a redistribution 
of income towards profit earners, which in turn can have different effects on domestic absorption, 
depending on whether the economy is in a wage- or profit-led regime. Moreover, the effect of a 
devaluation on net exports is not necessarily positive if the Marshall-Lerner condition is not 
satisfied. Lastly, balance sheet effects have a depressing effect on investment, so that 
devaluations are less likely to be expansionary in externally indebted economies. Therefore, it is 
  
necessary to empirically obtain the relevant parameters of the model before a prediction about 
the demand- and growth-effects of devaluations can be made for a specific country.  
Secondly, the paper has analysed the dynamics and stability of debt within the proposed 
framework. It has been argued that domestic firms take on foreign currency debt because it is 
cheaper. This, in turn, is due to a high illiquidity premium on domestic currency debt. Moreover, 
if the risk premium on domestic currency debt is more sensitive to the stock of external debt than 
the risk premium on foreign currency debt, a vicious cycle of external debt can occur. A higher 
stock of foreign currency debt then leads to an acceleration of external indebtedness. The main 
finding of the stability analysis is that strong animal spirits, high export demand, and export 
competitiveness improve stability, while strong balance sheet effects compromise it. 
Furthermore, foreign interest rate or illiquidity premium shocks, as well as a high sensitivity of 
the domestic interest rate premium with respect to external debt may turn a stable system 
unstable. Devaluations are stabilising only if they succeed in boosting domestic capital 
accumulation. If, however, devaluations depress domestic investment, they may undermine debt 
sustainability. This problem can occur even if the devaluation succeeds in improving the trade 
balance.  
When a country faces a balance-of-payments crisis, devaluation can be inevitable. However, an 
adjustment programme that seeks to improve international competitiveness at the expense of 
domestic capital accumulation can compromise debt sustainability. Moreover, if devaluations 
are combined with austerity policies that depress animal spirits they are even more likely to 
worsen the debt problem. Although such a deflationary approach may eventually improve the 
trade balance, the economic and social damage that is being incurred in the meantime can be 
substantial. Besides the effects of devaluations on aggregate demand, capital accumulation, and 
debt sustainability, the distributional effects should be evaluated in their own right. Especially if 
there are strong regressive distributional effects, and the expansionary effects are small, 
devaluations might do more harm than good. However, more empirical research on the 
distributional effects of devaluations is needed. 
The analysis suggests some measures to reduce external vulnerability. To reduce the likelihood 
of financial instability, the domestic interest rate would have to be reduced. Capital outflow 
controls would allow the central bank to do that. Moreover, capital inflow controls can prevent 
firms and banks from taking on foreign debt in the first place. However, they may not always be 
easy to enforce. Since foreign interest rate shocks are not under the control of domestic policy 
makers, the focus should lay on reducing the illiquidity and risk premia on domestic-currency 
debt that drive a wedge between the domestic and foreign interest rate. Large interest rate 
differentials due to high premia not only motivate domestic firms to take on risky foreign 
currency-denominated debt but also undermine debt sustainability. A reduction of the illiquidity 
and risk premium on domestic debt requires a stronger trust in the domestic currency, which can 
be achieved by strengthening the domestic financial sector. Investment-oriented prudential 
regulations and a domestic central bank that acts as a lender of last resort – in emergencies also 
for foreign currency-denominated debt by drawing on its foreign reserves – may be conducive 
to this end. Public and development banks that selectively provide cheap credit for long-term 
investment might play an important role too, as China and the East Asian Tigers have shown 
(Herr and Priewe, 2005; Stiglitz and Uy, 1996). This would stimulate a domestic credit-
investment-income-saving circuit and make the economy less dependent on foreign capital. 
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1 Currency mismatch occurs when assets and liabilities are denominated in different currencies. 
2 The MLC for unbalanced trade and a perfectly elastic supply of goods is given by  (
𝑋
𝑒𝑟𝑀
) 𝜂𝑥 + 𝜂𝑚 >  1, where ηx 
and ηm are the absolute values of the real exchange rate elasticities of exports and imports respectively, X is exports, 
𝑒𝑟 is the real exchange rate and imports is M. In case of a trade deficit, the ratio of exports to imports is smaller than 
unity. Thus, the MLC might not always be satisfied, especially in countries with strong trade deficits.  
3 Surveys of the contractionary devaluation debate are provided by Lizondo and Montiel (1989), and Bahmani-
Oskooee and Mitzea (2003). Bahmani-Oskooee and Mitzea (2003) also review the empirical evidence and conclude 
that the effects of real depreciations on output and growth have turned out to be rather inconclusive and country-
specific. A recent study (An et al., 2014) with 16 high and middle income countries also finds mixed results. 
4 I do not address the question whether a long-term undervaluation strategy is conducive to long-run growth. This 
is a separate topic that requires a different theoretical framework (see for example Razmi et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
the focus is restricted to small open economies whose domestic policies have no or negligible effects on the rest of 
the world – a plausible assumption for most developing and emerging market countries. 
5 For benchmark versions see Hein (2014, chap. 7) and Blecker (2011). 
6 Bulgaria, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Jordan, and Oman are a few examples of countries 
that have fallen into this category for several years since the millennium.  
7 Original sin, i.e. the ‘inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency’ (Eichengreen et al., 2007, p. 122) 
is pervasive in developing countries, but also significant in developed countries outside the financial centres (USA, 
UK, Switzerland and Japan) and the Eurozone. 
8 Although many authors have claimed that a devaluation typically worsens income distribution (Alexander 1952; 
Diaz-Alejandro 1963; Krugman and Taylor 1978), there is little empirical research on this question. Bahmani-
Oskooee (1997) finds that devaluations increase income inequality measured as the ratio of the income of the top 
20% to that of the bottom 40% of the population. Dünhaupt (2017) estimates the effect of various financialisation 
variables on the wage share and finds import prices to exercises a negative effect on the wage share. Hence, there 
is some indirect evidence that devaluations more commonly raise the profit share. 
9 It has to be noted that the linear specification in (11) assumes away a non-linearity in the Marshall-Lerner condition 
that stems from the valuation of imports by the exchange (see footnote 3). It can be shown that the implicit 
assumption behind equation (11) is an exchange rate elasticity of import demand of -1.  
 
 
  
 
10 Domestic currency debt does not enter the investment function not only to keep the model parsimonious, but also 
because the profit share in the investment function already captures the ability of firms to obtain liquid funds in 
domestic currency. Domestic currency debt is also not subject to exchange rate risk and thus less risky. Moreover, 
I abstract from negative effects of interest payments on investment to focus the analysis on balance sheet effects. 
For a post-Kaleckian model that analyses effects of interest payments on investment, see Hein (2014, chap. 9). 
11 The Keynesian stability condition may not be satisfied in the long-run (Skott, 2012). This constitutes another 
reason why the present model is confined to the short- and medium-run. 
12 Although in principle the central bank can set a rate above the one given by equation (15), it is assumed that the 
floor given by international arbitrage conditions is a binding constraint because the central bank has no interest in 
raising the rate further. It might be worried about negative effects on economic activity since the domestic rate is 
already high due to a large premium. Furthermore, commercial banks may charge a (constant) mark-up on the 
central bank base rate. For simplicity, it is assumed that the central bank directly sets the domestic lending rate. 
13 UIP is a strong but straightforward assumption that serves to capture the empirical fact that monetary policy in 
fixed exchange rate regimes with limited foreign reserves is significantly constrained (Obstfeld et al., 2005; Hosny 
et al., 2015). 
14 This idea is prominent in post-Keynesian work on currency and exchange rate issues (e.g. Herr, 2008; Andrade 
and Prates, 2013; Kaltenbrunner, 2015). Some authors use the notion of a ‘currency premium’, which is a subjective 
international liquidity premium that hard currencies offer because they function as relatively safe stores of wealth. 
The domestic interest rate premium 𝜌 can be regarded as the inverse of such a currency premium.  
15 Although exchange rate policy can only manipulate the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate follows the 
nominal exchange rate quite closely, so that a nominal devaluation usually translates into a real devaluation (Razmi 
et al., 2012, p. 152). 
16 In a survey of empirical studies over the past 50 years, Bahmani et al. (2013) show that empirical estimates of the 
MLC have often been either contradictory or changed over time. They conduct a meta-analysis of existing studies 
and find that the MLC is only statistically significantly satisfied in just under 30 percent of 92 estimated elasticities. 
Moreover, the authors conduct their own empirical analysis for a set of 29 countries over the period 1971-2009 and 
find the MLC to be met in only three countries. The case 𝑏1 ≤ 0 is therefore entirely possible, if not likely. 
17 Double-asterisks denote equilibrium variables into which both steady state debt ratios have been substituted.  
